Patchwork Patient Protection: Must We Choose a
Single Pattern?
The health care system has been greatly influenced by the introduction and subsequent proliferation of managed care' in the
industry.' In fact, the federal government and many state governments have encouraged the growth of managed care systems
through legislation, in an attempt to address various problems in
1 Managed care traditionally refers to "health care delivery arrangements that include cost containment strategies and risk allocation among payors and providers."
Rebecca L. Jackson & Karen W. Levy, Innovations in Managed Care, in HEALTH CARE
REFORM LAW INSTITUTE 249, 251 (1994). Initially, managed care originated with
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred Provider Organizations
(PPOs), but today managed care is an element of most health care delivery systems.
See id. at 252. See generally Carl H. Hitchner et al., IntegratedDelivery Systems: A Survey of
OrganizationalModels, 29 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 273 (1994) (examining the development of integrated delivery systems).
An HMO is a prepaid plan that provides comprehensive services to its members
by contracting with providers for a fixed fee. SeeJackson & Levy, supra, at 252. Typically, enrollees in an HMO pay only a co-payment for services and must use the enrolled providers. See id. In a non-emergency, an enrollee would usually not receive
any benefits if he or she failed to use an enrolled provider. See id. There are generally
three models of HMOs: staff, group, and Independent Practice Association (IPA).
See Sharon M. Glenn, Comment, Tort Liability of IntegratedHealth CareDelivery Systems:
Beyond Enterprise Liability, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 305, 311-12 (1994). For a brief
history of the development of HMOs, see DianaJoseph Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen,
Emerging Theories of Liability in the Managed Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 285,
291-92 (1995).
A PPO is a prepaid purchasing arrangement for health care between an employer or insurer and particular providers. See Christine Gasparovich, Note, Preferred
Provider Organizationsand Provider Contracting:New Analyses Under the Sherman Act, 37
HASTINGS L.J. 377, 377 (1985). Typically, it is a 'closed' panel of providers contracted
by the organization. SeeJackson & Levy, supra, at 253. The PPO then contracts with
payors for the panel to provide services to enrollees on a discounted, predetermined
fee-for-service basis. See id.; see also Gasparovich, supra, at 378. Generally, members
are not mandated to see an enrolled provider, but there are significant financial incentives to do so. SeeJackson & Levy, supra, at 253.
Point of service plans (POSs) allow the enrollee to determine the level of benefits
received by combining some elements of HMO and/or PPO plans with those of traditional indemnity plans. See id. at 253-54.
2 See William M. Sage & James M. Jorling, A World that Won't Stand Still: Enterprise
Liability by Private Contract,43 DEPAUL L. Rxv. 1007, 1012 (1994) (noting that the shift
to managed care has changed the landscape of the health care system). Most employers utilize a form of managed care in an attempt to keep coverage more affordable.
See id. About half of California's population subscribes to an HMO that offers comprehensive care, merging insurance with medical care. See id. at 1013.
The attributes of managed care are constantly changing and the recent growth of
managed care systems is partially due to the entry of profit-oriented business into the
arena. SeeJohn K. Iglehart, The Struggle Between Managed Care and Fee-for-ServicePractice,
331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 63, 65 (1994).
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the health care system. 3 Although managed care's critics are skeptical of its potential for achieving long-term success in transforming
the system, 4 managed care continues to be praised as the cure for
many of the ills of the health care system due to its ability to control the costs of health care.5
3 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-300e-17 (1991 & Supp. 11996) (authorizing establishment of HMOs); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62D.01 subd. 2 (West 1996) (same); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 26:2J-3 (West 1987) (same). The Minnesota statute includes the following
statement of purpose of the HMO legislation:
(a) Faced with the continuation of mounting costs of health care coupled with its inaccessibility to large segments of the population, the legislature has determined that there is a need to explore alternative
methods for the delivery of health care services, with a view toward
achieving greater efficiency and economy in providing these services.
(b) It is, therefore, the policy of the state to eliminate the barriers to
the organization, promotion, and expansion for health maintenance organizations; to provide for their regulation by the state commissioner of
health; and to exempt them from the operation of the insurance and
nonprofit health service plan corporation laws of the state except as
hereinafter provided.
(c) It is further the intention of the legislature to closely monitor the
development of health maintenance organizations in order to assess
their impact on the costs of health care to consumers, the accessibility
of health care to consumers, and the quality of health care provided to
consumers.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62D.01 subd. 2 (West 1996).
4 For example, medical specialty groups, the American Medical Association, and
some legislators are reluctant to joyfully embrace managed care as the core of a reformed health care system. See Iglehart, supra note 2, at 63. Many are motivated by
the reluctance to limit an individual's freedom to choose his or her own doctor, while
other medical groups are concerned that many physicians are losing their patients to
managed care systems. See id. Joining those who are skeptical of managed care as a
dominant delivery system for care, some liberal politicians fear that such a system may
neglect the poor for the sake of profits, thereby sacrificing care. See id. at 65.
Likewise, recent reports and studies suggest that it is still unclear whether managed care will ultimately lower health care costs beyond its temporary effect. See Gene
Koretz, Look Again at Medical Bills, Bus. WK., Aug. 28, 1995, at 24. Business Week
recently reported the results of a nationwide survey of employers regarding health
care costs. See id. The results revealed that employers saw an average increase of 6.5%
in health care premiums in 1994. See id. Particularly, large employers experienced a
9.7% increase and small employers incurred a 6.2% increase in HMO premiums. See
id.
Another commentator has expressed concern that if the result of the growth of
managed care is
a proliferation of corporate practices of medicine in which most physicians became employees, in a system in which protocol medicine was
the norm, in an erosion of local voluntarism in hospital care, and in the
elimination of cross-subsidization, creating additional obstacles to access for the poor, then a great deal would be lost.
Eli Ginzberg, The Destabilizationof Health Care, 315 NEw ENG.J. MED. 757, 760 (1986).
5 President Clinton's health care reform proposal introduced in November 1993
strongly endorsed managed care plans as the favored delivery system for health care.
See Iglehart, supra note 2, at 65. Other competing health care reform bills, such as
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The result is an increasingly competitive health care industry
marked by the dominance of managed care.6 The growth of managed care as an option in the health care system has created a new
environment in which we must consider the most effective way to
protect patients from some of the consequences of managed care.
In light of the increased commercialization of health care, it is appropriate to cast this discussion in terms of consumer protection.
Parts I and II of this Comment consider the effectiveness of
traditional malpractice liability and contract-based approaches respectively as methods of protecting the consumer in today's market. Finally, Part III explores the trend towards an increased
demand for information in the industry and the extent to which
such information may protect the health care consumer.

I.
A.

MALPRACTICE LIABILITY AS CONSUMER PROTECTION

Identifying the Tortfeasor

Malpractice liability, as well as tort law in general, is a method
of compensating an individual for injury incurred as a result of another's conduct.7 As such, it is primarily a retrospective system.'
An underlying objective of the system, however, is to deter conduct
that will result in another's injury.' Tort law requires that peoples'
conduct conform to societal standards; it is, therefore, a code of
behavior that is externally imposed upon individuals.' l Traditionally, malpractice law seeks to protect patients against uncompensated injury that is the result of a doctor's negligent treatment. 1
those sponsored by SenatorJohn Chafee (R-R.I.) and Representative Jim Cooper (D-

Tenn.), also featured managed care as a primary mode of reform. See id.
6 See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
7 SeeW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
(5th ed. 1984) (discussing the underlying functions of tort law).

§

4, at 20

8 See id. at 20, 26 (noting that tort law seeks to determine the appropriate party to
bear the loss after an injury occurs).
9 See id. at 25. Imposing liability on certain conduct creates an incentive not to
engage in that conduct if the actor realizes the potential for liability. See id.
10 See id. § 92, at 655, 656. "Tort obligations are in general obligations that are

imposed by law-apart from and independent of promises made and therefore apart
from the manifested intention of the parties-to avoid injury to others." Id. at 656.

Tort law allows the community to establish an ideal allocation of responsibility and
individuals must adhere to the standard set by the community. See PAUL C. WEILER,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 17 (1991); see also Walter Olsen, Tortification of Contract Law: Displacing Consent and Agreement, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1043, 1044 (1992)

(discussing the basic differences between tort and contract obligations).
11 See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the
Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 I-LARv. L. REV. 381, 399 (1994); WEILER,

supra note 10, at 17.
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A health care system dominated by managed care raises legal
and policy issues that are not adequately addressed or remediable
by the traditional medical malpractice system. 1 2 For example,
health care decision-making is more complex and involves more
actors in a system pervaded by managed care than the traditional
fee-for-service system. 3 In particular, decisions regarding health
care are being made by corporations, as well as the physician in
contact with the patient. 4 Although health care enterprises are
increasingly dominant and control is shifting away from the individual doctor, accountability has not yet entirely shifted to these
enterprises as liability is still generally associated with the practitioner.15 In recognition of this shift of control, however, managed
care organizations are increasingly being held responsible under
various theories of liability.' 6 Moreover, a systematized shift in lia12 See Sage & Jorling, supra note 2, at 1014 (stating that the medical malpractice
system is obsolete in the midst of the changing health care environment). Because of
the changing context, more sophisticated procedures for resolving disputes and improving quality management are needed. See id.
13 See FRANK M. MCCLELLAN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: LAW, TACTIcs, AND ETHICS 63

(1994). Before the 1970s, physicians dominated the medical decision-making process
and the doctor's profit motive was kept well. below the surface. See id. Today's decision-making system is more complex and the competing values are more prominent.
See id. A physician's medical and ethical judgments are more often overridden by cost
concerns, and many individuals take part in the decision process. See id.
For example, physician incentives, which are financial arrangements that either
reward or penalize physicians on the basis of their ability to meet the utilization objectives, are very controversial traits of managed care systems. See Wendy L. Krasner &
ThomasJ. Walsh, The Regulation of Physician Incentives, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 179,
179 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1995). Thus, these arrangements may result in a conflict
between the physician's self-interest and the patient's interest. See id. See generally
BRADFORD H. GRAY, THE PROFIT MOTIVE AND PATIENT CARE: THE CHANGING ACCOUNTABILrrY OF DocToRS AND HosPrrALS (1991) (exploring how profit motives shape physi-

cians' behavior and how the profit-seeking behavior is becoming more explicit and
pervasive as health care continues to shift from a professional service to a major economic sector).
14 See Sage &Jorling, supra note 2, at 1013 (noting thatjudgments that affect delivery of care are made by both "front-line practitioners" as well as corporate enterprises); McCLELLAN, supra note 13, at 63 (observing that besides the patient and
treating physician, nurses, insurance company physicians, and even hospital administrators seek to influence care delivery); see also infra notes 27-31 and accompanying
text.
15 See Sage &Jorling, supra note 2, at 1014. The majority of malpractice cases are
still between a patient and an individual physician. See id. "IT]he doctor no longer
really controls health care, as in the days of solo practice, but, when it comes to qualControl is shifting, structure is shifting,
ity, the doctor is still held accountable ....
the pattern of care is shifting; but accountability is not."' Id. at 1014 n.29 (quoting
DONALD M. BERWICK ET AL., CURING HEALTH CARE: NEW STRATEGIES FOR QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 12 (1990)).
16 See id. at 1008-09. There are four prevalent theories for malpractice liability
under which managed care systems have been found liable. See id. at 1009 n.7. The
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first two theories seek to hold the HMO vicariously liable based upon the physician's
negligence, while the others hold the entity directly liable for its own negligence. See
Glenn, supra note 1, at 314-37 (surveying vicarious liability, respondeat superior, ostensible agency, and direct liability). For the most part, HMOs are being held liable
under the same theories as hospitals. See Sage & Jorling, supra note 2, at 1009 n.7
(citing hospital and HMO liability case law).
The first theory is respondeat superior, in which a staff-model HMO would be
held liable for the negligence of its physician-employees. See id. An employer may be
held liable for the negligence of its employee where the employee was acting within
the scope of his or her employment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219
(1958). The application of this theory to a health care organization will depend upon
the nature of the organization and the degree of control that it exerts over its physicians. See Glenn, supra note 1, at 320, 321; see also Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health
Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 876 F.2d 174, 177, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding
that a health care organization could be held vicariously liable for the negligence of a
consulting physician to whom the patient was referred by the primary care-taker because the physician was answerable to the primary care-taker); Sloan v. Metropolitan
Health Council of Indianapolis, Inc., 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1108, 1109 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987) (holding that an HMO could be vicariously liable for a physician's negligent
failure to diagnose if the plaintiff could establish an agency or employer-employee
relationship). But see Raglin v. HMO Ill., Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153, 156, 158 (111. App. Ct.
1992) (holding that an HMO could not be held vicariously liable for the negligence
of its physicians because physicians and medical groups are independent contractors
in relation to the organization); Mitts v. H.I.P. of Greater N.Y., 478 N.Y.S.2d 910, 911
(App. Div. 1984) (holding that a health care organization could not be held liable for
malpractice because its medical group was an independent contractor).
Where respondeat superior is inapplicable, a health care entity may also be held
vicariously liable under a theory of ostensible agency. See Sage &Jorling, supra note 2,
at 1009 n.7; Glenn, supra note 1, at 321. The thrust of this argument is that the
organization created the appearance that an agency relationship existed. See Glenn,
supra note 1, at 321-22. "One who represents that another is his servant or other
agent and thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of
such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm caused by the
lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were
such." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958); see also Decker v. Saini, 14
Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1556, 1558-60 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1991) (holding that an
HMO could be held liable, under an ostensible agency theory, for a physician's negligent failure to diagnose); Boyd v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1234 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988) (approving the ostensible theory of liability where an HMO holds
itself out so that the patient turns to the organization for care); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965) (stating that the employer of an independent contractor
is subject to liability for the contractor's conduct as if the employer himself acted).
Health care systems may also be responsible in tort for the breach of a duty directly owed to a patient. See Glenn, supra note 1, at 326. For example, an organization may be liable for injury resulting from the breach of its duty to select competent
physicians. See Sage &Jorling, supra note 2, at 1009 n.7; see also McClellan v. Health
Maintenance Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053, 1059 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that
HMOs owe a direct duty to their enrollees to hire competent primary care physicians); GEORGE D. POZGAR, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 143-69
(5th ed. 1993) (focusing on the duties of hospitals).
Finally, managed care institutions may be held directly liable for injuries resulting from their utilization review or other economically motivated behavior. See Sage
&Jorling, supra note 2, at 1009 n.7. See also, e.g., Wilson v. Blue Cross of Cal., 271 Cal.
Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. 1990) (finding that an insurance company's denial of coverage
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17
bility to the enterprise is a viable option.
Thus, this shift in control has prompted many to suggest that
reform of the malpractice system should include a corresponding
systemic shift of liability from the individual physician.1 8 Many advocate "enterprise liability"19 as a way to reconcile traditional malpractice law with corporate control of modern health care
models.2 0 In such a system, the focus of medical liability would be
shifted to health care organizations on the premise that the threat
of liability would provide incentives for such organizations to develop more effective quality assurance procedures. 21 Additionally,

for hospitalization of a mentally ill patient was a substantial factor in the patient's
subsequent suicide); Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that "[t]hird party payors of health care services can be held legally accountable
when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in the design or implementation of cost containment mechanisms"). But see Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1322 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiffs claim based
upon an organization's "utilization review" decision was preempted by Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)); but see also Bearden & Maedgen, supra note 1,
at 298-329 (surveying the extension of varying theories of vicarious and direct liability
to managed care organizations); infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
17 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 11, at 382. The theory of enterprise liability is
rooted in traditional tort principles, which attempt to place the responsibility for injuries on the enterprise or individual who is in the best position to make a decision as to
the risks and safety measures involved. See id. at 384. The adoption of an enterprise
liability system would represent full legal recognition of the transformation of the
health care system. See id. at 394.
18 See id. at 382; Sage &Jorling, supra note 2, at 1008.
19 Enterprise liability transfers liability for medical malpractice to the organization,
rather than the individual physicians. See Glenn, supra note 1, at 306.
20 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 11, at 436; Sage & Jorling, supra note 2, at
1008-09, 1008 n.5. The Clinton health care plan was reported and projected to include provisions for enterprise liability, but the final draft did not contain a proposal
for federally mandated enterprise liability. See Glenn, supra note 1, at 305-06.
21 See WEILER, supra note 10, at 160. Because health care organizations, like hospitals and managed care systems, can most effectively lower the rate of unacceptable
injuries, they are the appropriate actors to bear accountability for injury. See id. at
160-61. Enterprise liability would focus liability on the part of the health care system
with the best ability to improve the quality of health care. See Abraham & Weiler,
supra note 11, at 411.
There are three major advantages of replacing the traditional malpractice system
with an explicit, coordinated system of enterprise liability: fostering a sense of physician teamwork by improving the relations between clinical managers and providers;
improving the quality of care; and fostering administrative and judicial efficiency in
responding to malpractice claims. See Sage &Jorling, supra note 2, at 1019-21.
Critiques of an enterprise liability system assert that such a system further threatens physician autonomy and may not be as effective a deterrent applied to health care
organizations as it is with hospitals because the organizations have a less centralized
management structure than individual hospitals. See Barry R. Furrow, Quality Control
in Health Care: Developments in the Law of Medical Malpractice, in LEGAL MEDICINE 1994
83, 113 (Cyril H. Wecht ed., 1994).
Imposing liability on the organizations would also provide an additional incen-
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some suggest that organizations should voluntarily assume liability
through contract, thereby creating voluntary enterprise liability.2 2
Regardless of whether health care enterprises voluntarily bear liability, they are likely to continue to incur liability through the continued application of common law principles.2 3
B.

Standard of Care: The Use of Utilization Review and Clinical
Practice Guidelines

The extent to which malpractice liability protects the health
care consumer is largely dependent upon the standard of care that
the law imposes on a provider. Traditionally, "quality" care refers
to the level and nature of care that a well-trained and well-regarded
physician would employ in similar circumstances. 24 As the customary practice of well-trained physicians continues to come under fire
as defensive medicine and a misallocation of resources, the concept of "quality" care is being reevaluated in today's numerous
health care debates.2 5 In today's system, "quality" care is, to a large
extent, being redefined by health care statutes, judicial decisions,
tive for the organizations to choose the most qualified physicians. See Decker v. Saini,
14 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1556, 1560 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1991).
22 See Sage & Jorling, supra note 2, at 1015. Enterprise liability is not necessarily
imposed on the health care system by external forces. See id. at 1042. Rather, organizations can voluntarily assume liability and thereby create a system of accountability
based on contract, which encourages collaboration, improves the quality of care, and
reduces liability costs. See id. at 1042-43. Voluntary enterprise liability could be created through contracts between health care organizations and physicians by creating
contractual indemnification. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 11, at 429. Although
voluntary enterprise liability will not solve all of the ills of the medical malpractice
system, it will tend to move the "system in the same direction as the rest of the health
care industry." Sage & Jorling, supra note 2, at 1043.
23 See Sage &Jorling, supra note 2, at 1008-09, 1009 n.7. Courts, in recognizing the
increased role and duties of managed care organizations, are expanding the common
law tort principles of medical liability, which only hold the care provider responsible.
See Glenn, supra note 1, at 306. Thus, even in the absence of expressly mandated
enterprise liability, the new health care delivery systems will likely be subject to medical liability. See id.
24 See Rand E. Rosenblatt, Equality, Entitlement, and National Health Care Reform: The
Challenge of Managed Competition and Managed Care, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 105, 107-08
(1994). This is the basis for the traditional legal standard of care in medical malpractice claims. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965) (stating that one who
practices the profession "is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally
possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar
communities").
Many states have codified this common law standard of care. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 6-5-484(a) (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.540(1) (Michie 1995); Aiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 12-563 (West Supp. 1994); Aiu. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(a) (1) (Michie 1987);
IDAHO CODE § 6-1012 (1990).
25 See Rosenblatt, supra note 24, at 108.
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contracts, practice guidelines, and professional standards.2 6
Deviations from the accepted practice, the care which a qualified physician would render, continue to be a necessary starting
point in assessing liability. 27 The care that a patient receives from a

managed care organization, however, is influenced today by more
than the individual doctor. 28 For example, managed care organizations are subject to many internal and external influences that ultimately affect the quality and quantity of care provided. These
factors include internal efforts to control costs and to use resources
effectively, as well as external governmental regulations and market
29
pressures.
Managed care organizations are based upon utilization management, which is a method of cost containment based upon more
efficient use of resources."0 Utilization review (UR) and clinical
practice guidelines are both efforts by managed care organizations
to control the quality, quantity, and cost of care provided to patients."' As such, these efforts dictate the standard of care provided and play an important role in today's health care decisionmaking.
One of the primary cost containment measures used by managed care organizations is UR1 2 Through UR, organizations are
26 See id. at 111. To the extent that "quality" care is being redefined by these
sources, the interests and concerns of the various types of consumers should and must
be given consideration in making such policies that will ultimately affect them. See id.;
see also infta note 107 and accompanying text.
27 See Furrow, supra note 21, at 84.
28 See MCCLELLAN, supra note 13, at 63. "[T]he earlier untrammeled freedom of
the profession to determine how, where, and for how long patients would be treated
is being circumscribed by new rules, regulations, and protocols." Ginzberg, supra
note 4, at 759-60.
29 In today's commercial health care environment, pharmaceutical companies offer discounts to plans depending upon how much of an influence such plans exert
over physician prescribing. See Elyse Tanouye, Big DrugMakers Regaining Control Over
Their Prices, WALL ST.J., July 12, 1995, at B4. If a plan doesn't have much influence
and control over which drugs are prescribed by its providers, the drug companies no
longer offer the plan such discounts. See id. Thus, the possibility of receiving a discount creates an economic incentive for a plan to persuade its physicians to prescribe
certain drugs. See id.
30 See Glenn, supra note 1, at 332.
31 See id.; Alice G. Gosfield, Measuring Performance and Quality: The State of the Art
and Legal Concerns, in,HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 31, 55 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 1995).
32 See John F. Bales, III & Lisa A. DeMarco, Selected Topics in Medical Malpractice
Litigation, in HEALTH CARE LAw 1993 381, 498-99 (1993). Utilization review is an external evaluation of the appropriateness of medical care provided based on clinical
criteria. See id. at 499. These evaluations may be conducted by traditional insurers,
purchasers, or organizations. See id.
Utilization review is a process of reviewing a provider's treatment of a patient by
comparing the services provided with an established norm of treatment provided to
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able to exert control over the medical services and care available
and administered to their subscribers."3 Although there is traditionally a distinction between coverage and medical decisions,3 4
courts are beginning to recognize the convergence of the two in
the managed care context, as coverage decisions increasingly have
clinical consequences. 3 5 For example, a federal court has acknowledged "that as the health care industry evolves, the line between
arranging and paying for health care services and directly provid36
ing such services may become blurry."
Prospective3 7 and concurrent review,3 8 the types of UR most
frequently used by managed care organizations, influence a patient's choice among treatment options to a greater extent than a
retrospective3 9 system, which is more characteristic of a traditional
insurer.o In particular, the knowledge that the plan will not cover
a specific treatment is more likely to discourage a patient from following a doctor's recommendation for that treatment than is the
knowledge that there is a mere risk that the plan will not cover the
similar patients. See Glenn, supra note 1, at 332. There are three different types of
utilization review, which are categorized by the timing of the review: prospective review requires prior approval of treatment; concurrent review monitors and evaluates
treatment to determine if a modification of patient treatment is warranted; and retrospective review evaluates the appropriateness of treatment after the services have been
provided. See id.
33 See Bales & DeMarco, supra note 32, at 499.
34 See Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a state tort law claim was preempted by ERISA because the organization
performing utilization review gave medical advice in the context of making benefit
determinations).
35 See Sage &Jorling, supra note 2, at 1018.
36 Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.N.J. 1994).
37 Prospective review of treatment requires prior approval for hospital admission
in non-emergency instances and for a proposed length of stay in the hospital. See
Richard A. Hinden & Douglas Elden, Liability Issues for Managed CareEntities, 14 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 52 (1990).
38 Concurrent review is a review of the medical care provided to determine the
appropriateness of the treatment and the length of a hospital stay that is conducted at
the same time as the treatment is being rendered. See MCCLELLAN, supra note 13, at
67; see also Hinden & Elden, supranote 37, at 52 (stating that liability is more likely to
result from concurrent than retrospective review).
39 Retrospective review is an examination of the medical services provided that
occurs after the treatment is completed. See MCCLELLAN, supra note 13, at 66; see also
Hinden & Elden, supra note 37, at 52 (stating that liability is less likely to result from
retrospective review than the other types).
40 See Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1332 (5th Cir. 1992)
(acknowledging that an organization engaged by the plaintiff's HMO to perform independent utilization review made medical decisions incident to benefit
determinations).
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same treatment.4 1
Physicians have traditionally been accused of practicing defensive medicine and over-treating patients to avoid liability, thereby
increasing medical costs. 4 2 Cost containment procedures may have
the opposite effect. 43 Thus, rather than an over-use of medical resources, an under-utilization may result from cost containment activities. In certain instances, the internal cost containment goals of
managed care organizations may threaten the quality of care provided. 44 In that regard, managed care organizations may be subject to liability as a consequence of their cost containment
activities.4 5
41 See id. at 1331-32; see also Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 812 (Ct. App.
1986) (distinguishing between the withholding of payment and treatment).
42 See PozGAR, supra note 16, at 504-05. The practice of defensive medicine is fostered by the current malpractice system. See id. at 504. Defensive medicine is either
an over- or under-consumption of health care resources in an attempt to reduce the
potential for litigation and provide a defense should litigation ensue. See id. at 505. A
Harvard study team found that physicians perceive a greater likelihood of being sued
for malpractice than actually exists, and in response they tend to perform more tests,
reduce the scope of their practices, and treat fewer high-risk patients. See id. at 504.
Some critics also contend that the threat of malpractice liability encourages physicians to practice defensive medicine which, with new expensive medical technologies, has contributed to the rising health care costs. See MCCLELLAN, supra note 13, at

76; see also AMEucAN MEDICAL AssOCIATION, FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE HEALTH
CARE Cos-r PROBLEM 7-22 (1993) (arguing that in addition to defensive medicine, the

following factors have contributed to the cost problem: the aging of the U.S. population; increasing health care fraud; lifestyle and social factors such as the use of alcohol, drugs, and tobacco; and the influence of poverty and violence).
43 See McCLELLAN, supra note 13, at 74, 76. McClellan formulates an example to

illustrate this point in which an HMO patient sees her opthomalogist who diagnosed
her with glaucoma. See id. at 64. The opthomalogist did not order a referral and a CT
scan after considering the relative costs and the patient's physicians. See id. The
opthomalogist acted in the same manner as most qualified professionals would have
in these circumstances. See id. The patient was later diagnosed with a brain tumor
and lost her vision; this would have been prevented had the CT scan been performed
earlier. See id. McClellan suggests that a traditional fee-for-service physician would be
more likely to order the test due to the threat of liability, i.e., practice defensive
medicine. See id. at 73-74. The reaction of the HMO physician, however, would likely
be the opposite. See id. at 74.
Cost containment measures are designed to address the issues of rising costs due
to over-, and often unnecessary, utilization of health care resources, but may present
other barriers to a system of sound decision-making. See id. at 76. McClellan concludes that health care decision-making that balances the interests of cost and the
patient's well-being is desired, but the final decision should be made by a well-trained
physician who considers the patient's well-being to be his or her primary responsibility. See id.
44 See id. at 75. Although the goals of quality health care and cost containment are
not irreconcilable, cost containment strategies may induce decision-makers to make
choices that conflict with the goal of maintaining high-quality care. See id.
45 See Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 883 (Ct. App. 1990) (finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an insurance com-
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Managed care organizations also attempt to control the quality
and cost of the care provided by using clinical practice guidelines. 6 These guidelines, developed from outcomes research, are
intended to aid physicians and patients in making decisions regarding the course of treatment for a particular condition.4 7 Thus,
medical care based on customary practice is being replaced by care
based on clinical practice guidelines developed from qualitative reviews.4 8 One of the legal implications of the use of clinical practice
guidelines is their role in malpractice litigation.4 9 If an injury ocpany's denial of coverage through utilization review for hospitalization of a mentally
ill patient substantially contributed to the patient's subsequent suicide); Wickline v.
State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that "[t]hird party payors of
health care services can be held legally accountable when medically inappropriate
decisions result from defects in the design or implementation of cost containment
mechanisms").
46 See Gosfield, supranote 31, at 55. These types of guidelines are also commonly
referred to as critical paths, practice guidelines, clinical pathways, and CareMaps. See
id. at 56. These guidelines are described as "'educational tools that enable physicians
to obtain the advice of recognized clinical experts, stay abreast of the latest clinical
research, and assess the clinical significance of often conflicting research findings;"'
and "'clinical management tools that organize, sequence and time the major interventions of nursing staff physicians and other departments for a particular case type,
subset or condition"' Id. (quoting Rhonda Bergman, Getting the Goods on Guidelines,
Hosp. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Oct. 20, 1994, at 70).
Thus, there is little consensus regarding the meaning of "practice guidelines."
See Rosenblatt, supra note 24, at 130. There is a distinction between practice guidelines and medical review criteria, as the former are used to assist in making decisions
regarding appropriate care and the latter are intended to be used by third parties to
evaluate the appropriateness of the care for purposes of cost containment and quality
assurance. See id. at 131.
The use of such guidelines is met with considerable debate, as evidenced by the
disagreement regarding the guidelines for the treatment of cataract and hypertension
patients. See Gosfield, supra note 31, at 56-57. Many medical specialty associations are
beginning to evaluate the guidelines developed by various organizations. See id. at 57.
At this time, however, there is no consensus on the appropriate methods and criteria
with which to evaluate them. See Rosenblatt, supra note 24, at 132. The Institute Of
Medicine issued a report that enumerated eight desirable characteristics of clinical
practice guidelines, but these characteristics do not provide a practical and usable
standard of evaluation. See id. at 132-33.
Hospitals, HMOs, professional organizations and specialist societies, insurance
companies, and the government are currently involved in developing guidelines. See
id. at 132; Furrow, supra note 21, at 86.
47 See Anthony P. Szczygiel, Beyond Informed Consent, 21 OHio N.U. L. REv. 171, 233
(1994).
48 See Szczygiel, supra note 47, at 232-33. The purpose of clinical practice guidelines is to offer scientifically valid clinical alternatives to aid practitioners and patients
in making medical care decisions. HHS Pain Guidelines: The Feds Say They Want a
Revolution, TRENDS IN HEALTH Bus., Mar. 27, 1992, at IT [hereinafter HHS Pain Guidelines]. The goal of such guidelines is to separate effective medical procedures and
drugs from ineffective ones by distilling available outcomes research. See id.
49 See Gosfield, supra note 31, at 56-58.
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curs where the care provided was within a recognized standard of
proper care, negligence may be difficult to prove. 50 To the extent
that such guidelines are used as shields from liability, they represent a codified standard of care.
C. Standard of Care: Legislation
Clinical practice guidelines and UR prompt debate regarding
the appropriateness of intruding upon an individual physician's exercise of medical judgment, which has traditionally been the cornerstone of health care decision-making. Increasingly, legislation
may also threaten the attending physician's and patient's roles as
the primary decision-makers. Although federal and state statutes
regulate the accreditation of Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs) by establishing the basic health care services that a plan
must cover, 5 1 some state statutes more specifically outline treatments that the HMO must provide.5 2 The debate surrounding new
legislation relating to the appropriate length of a hospital stay for
new mothers after delivery illustrates the threat posed by governmental regulation. Furthermore, the maternity stay issue provides
50 See id. at 58. Maine launched a five-year experiment in January of 1992 to determine whether guidelines could reduce the potential for liability if physicians complied with state-issued practice guidelines. See HHS Pain Guidelines, supra note 48, at
IT. The legislature ordered the Bureau of Insurance and the Board of Licensure to
establish the medical liability project and authorized them to formulate practice parameters with the aid of various medical professionals. SeeME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§§ 2971, 2973 (West Supp. 1995). Physicians in the experiment, those who practice
anesthesiology, emergency medicine, radiology, and obstetrics/gynecology, may use
compliance with the guidelines as an affirmative defense in court. See id. §§ 2972,
2975(1). The Maine legislature has established practice guidelines for 20 procedures
in these specialty areas for the experiment. See Bales & DeMarco, supra note 32, at
409. Approximately 400 physicians volunteered to participate in the program. See
Mary Darby, Can Maine's MalpracticeProtection Project Convince Physiciansto Utilize Guidelines?, MANAGED CARE L. OUTLOOK, Nov. 16, 1993, at 6. Regardless of whether the
system results in a lower risk of liability, such a system may also have the effect of
reducing malpractice costs by eliminating the need for dueling experts in court because the state law would establish the standard of care and a method of determining
whether it was met. See id.
The Maine Medical Liability Demonstration Project was intended to reduce medical costs associated with defensive medicine and the risks of malpractice claims. See
id. Thus, maloccurence is immune from suit because a physician is protected if he or
she takes the correct course of action, but a bad result nevertheless occurs. See id.
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 300e-1 (1991 & Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2J-4.3 (West
1996).
52 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2J-4.4, 26:2J-4.5, 26:2J-4.6 (West 1996) (mandating
that an HMO provide, for example, "a left-sided colon examination of 35 to 60 centimeters every five years" for all patients over 45 and an annual mammogram for women over 49).
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a framework for exploring the impact of the various pressures on
health care decision-making and the standard of care.
The newest legislation in this area, establishing minimum hospital stays for new mothers, is a direct response to a developing
standard of care particularly within managed care systems.53 The
cost containment measures and profit incentives of HMOs resulted
in a trend of reducing the length of hospital stays of new mothers
and their babies to less than twenty-four hours.5 4 In response to
the trend towards these "drive-thru" deliveries, many state legislatures have recently passed or introduced legislation providing for a
mandatory minimum hospital stay for new mothers and their
babies.55
53 See New Jersey Law Requires Minimal 48-Hour Stay for Women, Babies Following Childbirth, Health Care Daily (BNA), July 3, 1995, available in WESTLAW, BNA-HCD
Database, 7/3/95 HCD d4 [hereinafter N.J. Law Requires Minimal Stay]. According to
a study released on August 9, 1995, by HCIA, Inc., there is a greater likelihood that
members of HMOs will be discharged quickly after delivery than subscribers to other
private insurers or Medicaid. See Rapid DischargeAfter Cesarean Sections Lead to More
Hospital Readmissions, 3 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 1318, 1319 (Aug. 14, 1995).
The study found that 57.7% of HMO members were sent home within 24 hours of
delivery, while 35.9% of other commercial insurance and 39.3% of Medicaid enrollees were sent home within the same time period. See id.
54 See Ron Winslow, Newborn Measure in New Jersey Spells Victory for Mothers, WALL ST.
J., June 29, 1995, at B16. Many managed care organizations follow practice guidelines
that allow 24-hour discharges for deliveries. See id. Both the American College of
Obstetrics and Gynecology and the American Academy of Pediatrics have voiced their
concerns about the strict adherence to such guidelines. See id. Some guidelines allow
for the release of newborns and their mothers within six to twelve hours of delivery.
See PhysiciansBlame Insurance Profit Trends in Early Hospital Releases, Health Care Daily
(BNA), Sept. 13, 1995, availablein WESTLAW, BNA-HCD Database, 9/13/95 HCD d4
[hereinafter Physicians Blame Insurance].
Representatives of the American Medical Association and the American College
of Obstetrics and Gynecology told the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee on September 12, 1995, that "[i]nsurance companies' quest for profits is forcing
an unsafe trend of early hospital releases of women and newborns following childbirth." See id. In contrast, doctors representing prominent managed care organizations defended the medical soundness of early release guidelines, denied that profit
motives lie behind the policy, and urged the committee not to mandate the length of
hospital stays for newborns and their mothers. See id.
Similarly, although HMOs have an economic incentive to shorten the stays of
newborns and their mothers, they have no incentive to continue such a practice if the
policy subsequently caused additional health problems. See N.J. Law Requires Minimal
Stay, supra note 53.
55 Maryland was the first state to adopt legislation mandating a 48-hour hospital
stay after childbirth. See H.B. 888, 1995 Leg., 1st Sess. (Md. 1995). Maryland enacted
this bill on May 25, 1995, citing an increase in the incidence of Phenylketonuria specimens, a cause of severe mental retardation resulting from hospital stays of less than 24
hours after childbirth. See id. Such tests are most accurate if performed 24 hours
after the newborn's first milk feeding. See Donna Leusner, New Moms Get Break Under
Assembly Bill STAR-LEDGER, May 23, 1995, at 1. The Maryland bill mandates that
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The debate regarding the appropriateness of this type of legislation centers around the issue of control in health care decisionmaking.5 6 The legislation restricts a doctor's ability to make care
determinations with his or her patient.5 7 In addition, whereas the
accepted standard of care is traditionally set by the medical profeshealth maintenance organizations must follow the criteria in the "'Guidelines for Perinatal Care' prepared by the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists," which recommend a 48-hour hospital stay
after childbirth. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 19-1305.4(a) (1996).
The New Jersey Legislature also recently passed a bill that mandates coverage
"for a minimum of 48 hours of in-patient care following a vaginal delivery and a minimum of 96 hours of in-patient care following a cesarean section" N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:2J-4.9(a) (West 1996). The legislation provides that if the plan provides for postdelivery care for the mother and newborn in the home, it need not provide the minimum in-patient care unless it is deemed medically necessary by an attending physician. See id. § 26:2J-4.9(b).
A similar bill is being debated in the California legislature. See A.B. 1841, 19951996 Leg., 1st Sess. (Ca. 1995). Assemblywoman Figueroa introduced the bill to curtail the trend of releasing newborns and their mothers within eight hours of delivery;
in support of the bill, the legislator cited increased risks of jaundice, dehydration,
malnutrition, and infection that result from the early-release practice. See California
Assembly Panel to Take up Bill MandatingMinimum Childbirth Coverage, Health Care Daily
(BNA), Sept. 25, 1995, available in WESTLAW, BNA-HCD Database, 9/25/95 HCD d8
[hereinafter CaliforniaAssembly Panel]. A similar proposal has also been introduced in
the New York and Ohio Legislatures. See A.B. 8125, 1995-1996 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 1995); S.B. 199, 121st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1995). Similarly, the Delaware
legislature recently created a Perinatal Health Care Task Force to study and make
recommendations regarding the issue of the appropriate length of hospital stay for
mothers and newborns. See H. Con. Res. 30, 138th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Del. 1995). The
Resolution cited the New Jersey and Maryland legislation as well as general concerns
regarding the appropriate level of care in this area. See id.
In September 1996, Congress passed the Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996. See Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2874. Like the state legislation in this area, the federal law
prohibits an insurance issuer that offers group health insurance from restricting coverage for a mother's and newborn child's hospital stay to less than 48 hours following
a vaginal delivery and less than 96 hours following a cesarean section. See id. § 711.
The statute, however, allows the attending physician and mother to decide that a
hospital stay shorter than the established minimum is appropriate. See id. This exception reflects Congress' findings that a decision regarding the length of a hospital stay
following childbirth should be made by the attending doctor and mother upon considering the unique circumstances, including the health of the mother and newborn
and the availability of follow-up care. See id. § 602. The Senate hearings on the bill in
September 1995 included testimony by three families who experienced tragedy allegedly as a result of the early-discharge policies. See Physicians Blame Insurance, supra
note 54.
56 See Winslow, supra note 54, at B16. The New York Times reported that Susan
Pisano, a spokeswoman for the Group Health Association of America, an organization
representing HMOs, offered that doctors and patients, not legislators, were the appropriate actors to decide how long babies and their mothers should remain in the hospital. See id.
57 See Physicians Blame Insurance, supra note 54.
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sion and enforced by tort law,5 8 this legislation imposes a standard
upon the profession.
Another important issue relating to the appropriateness of legislation in this area is the extent to which a standard of care should
be strictly codified. 59 The medical standard of accepted practice
traditionally develops through journals, the interaction of leaders
of the profession, and collegial networks.6' This on-going dialogue
within the profession regarding the efficacy of new technologies
and procedures is antithetical to a strictly codified standard of care.
II.
A.

CONTRACT THEORIES

Liability Based on Contract Theories

Although courts are historically reluctant to enforce an alleged contract for a result or a warranty of quality against a physician, it may be time to abandon such reluctance in today's health
care context. 61 The relationship between a patient and a physician
is essentially a contractual one in which the patient agrees to pay
the physician for services rendered and the physician agrees to use
the professionally accepted standard of care.6 2 Accordingly, there
can traditionally be no recovery for breach of contract or warranty
against a physician unless there is a clear, express agreement to
58 See Furrow, supra note 21, at 86. Typically, the standard of care in a medical
malpractice action is determined by the "'mode or form of treatment which a reasonable and prudent member of the medical profession would undertake under the
same or similar circumstances."' RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
189 (citing Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977)).
The traditional deference of courts to the medical community for the appropriate standard of care is generally greater than that afforded to customary practices in
other areas because judges and juries are ordinarily not in a position to determine the
reasonableness of their actions given the nature of their work. See Clarence Morris,
Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 1147, 1164 (1942); see also supra note 24 and
accompanying text.,
59 See PhysiciansBlame Insurance,supra note 54. Sharon Levine, the Associate Director of Permanente Medical Group, Inc., suggests that "' [t]o freeze standards of care
into statute through legislation will impede progress toward the dual goals of quality
improvement and cost effectiveness."' Id. Similarly, Richard Marshall, the chief of
pediatrics for Harvard Committee Health Plan, stated that it is inappropriate to adopt
an "'inflexible statutory standard for an exact number of hours for a hospital maternity stay."' Id.
60 See Furrow, supra note 21, at 86.
61 See WEILER, supra note 10, at 94. Although a doctor-patient relationship is in
many respects contractual, the function of tort law has traditionally been to flesh out
the nature of the relationship. See id. See generallyJack W. Shaw, Jr., Annotation, Recovery Against Physicianon Basis of Breach of Contract to Achieve ParticularResult or Cure, 43
A.L.R.3d 1221 (1972) (surveying case law and policy arguments regarding whether to
recognize express contracts to achieve a cure).
62 See Cirafici v. Goffen, 407 N.E.2d 633, 635 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
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achieve a certain result or cure.63
As the health care system attempts to adapt to the new competitive environment by producing and making data available to
consumers, 64 this attempt may expose managed care to increased
liability on contract theories.6 5 The tension created by the demand
for increased information and the potential liabilities based on the
publication of such information has been partially addressed by
only a few legislatures.6 6
Health care systems that compete based upon various value
predicates may be exposed to increased liability by virtue of the
claims that they make about the quality of care the system provides. 67 Advertising, a key to gaining customers in competitive industries, is increasingly used by managed care systems to gain
subscribers. 68 The advertising practices of HMOs are prescribed by
statute in most states.69 HMOs' increasing use of advertising and
63 See, e.g., Depenbrok v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 144 Cal. Rptr. 724, 726
(Ct. App. 1978) (holding that a plaintiff could sustain a breach of warranty claim
against a physician if the physician made a clear, specific promise to achieve a particular result upon which the patient relied); Cirafici, 407 N.E.2d at 637 (holding that a
plaintiff could state a claim for breach of contract or warranty against a physician,
especially in the context of elective procedures, where the plaintiff could establish a
clear, express promise that is not to be confused with therapeutic reassurances); Bobrick v. Bravstein, 497 N.Y.S.2d 749, 751 (App. Div. 1986) (holding that in order to
sustain a breach of contract or warranty claim against a physician or hospital, a plaintiff must be able to allege an express promise to effectuate a cure or achieve a specific
result). But see Salem Orthopedic Surgeons, Inc. v. QuinnP 386 N.E.2d 1268, 1271,
1273 (Mass. 1979) (holding that a claim of breached warranty or promise against a
physician is essentially a claim of malpractice and cannot be sustained as a contract
action); Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Mass. 1973) (holding that breach
of warranty claims against a physician are inherently suspect, but could be established
with clear proof).
64 See infra part III.
65 See Gosfield, supra note 31, at 66, 67. Because the publication of performance
data has the potential to result in an unintended warranty of quality or to subject
managed care organizations to a standard higher than the law would ordinarily impose, many organizations are reluctant to publish such information and to use such
qualifiers as "best" and "highest quality." See id.at 66.
66 See id. at 61.
67 See id. at 68.
68 See id. at 66 (noting that advertising among HMOs in California has greatly
increased).
69 For example, New Jersey's "Health Maintenance Organizations Act" specifically
addresses the issue of advertising by HMOs. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2J-1-42 (West
1996). The act explicitly prohibits HMOs from using untrue or misleading advertising or solicitation or any deceptive evidence of coverage. See id.§ 26:2J-15(a). This
section also defines untrue, misleading and deceptive for the purposes of the Act. See
id. § 26:2J-15(a)(1)-(3). The Act further requires that an HMO must file with the
State Department of Health copies of all advertisements that will be available to residents of NewJersey. See id. § 26:2J-40(a). The advertisements must be filed at least 30
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other literature to persuade consumers to subscribe, however, will
likely tempt competitors to stretch or coat the truth in some way.7 °
Courts may be increasingly willing to look to a plan's advertisements, brochures, and other literature to create contractual duties
to the consumer. 7 1 The publication of performance data 72 may
create an implied, and often unintended, warranty of quality to individual or group purchasers. 73 Therefore, managed care organizations may be exposed to liability for breach of contract based
days prior to the time that they will be made available within New Jersey or to its
residents. See id. The Commissioner of the State Department of Health may disapprove of any advertisement that he or she finds misleading, false, or uses scare tactics
or unnecessarily confusing data. See id.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 641.385 (West 1996)
(permitting the Department of Insurance to order the discontinuation of a deceptive
advertisement); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62D.12 subd. 1 (West 1996) (prohibiting HMOs
from using misleading or deceptive advertisements, solicitations, or evidence of
coverage).
In considering the possible liabilities resulting from HMO advertising, federal
laws are also implicated. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1991) (declaring methods of unfair
competition unlawful).
In order to sustain an action based upon a health care organization's advertisements or other publications, the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
must not protect the speech involved. See Gosfield, supra note 31, at 65. Essentially,
the plaintiff must establish that the statements were commercial speech rather than
fully protected contributions to the marketplace of ideas. See id.
70 See Gosfield, supra note 31, at 66; US Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater
Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 921-39 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussing issues of fraud, misrepresentation, defamation, and commercial speech in a suit arising out of a comparative advertising war between an HMO and a traditional health insurer).
71 See Boyd v. Einstein, 547 A.2d 1229, 1230 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). The Boyd court
looked to the plan's advertisements, which guaranteed quality, to find the provider to
be an ostensible agent of the plan. See id. at 1231, 1232. In Boyd, a widower brought
suit against the HMO after his wife died while under the care of their HMO's participating physicians. See id. at 1229, 1230. The decedent sought treatment from her
primary care physician after finding "alump in her breast." Id. at 1230. The primary
care physician ordered a mammogram and referred the decedent to a specialist in
accordance with the procedures in the subscriber's agreement. See id. The surgeon
to whom the decedent was referred punctured the decedent's chest wall with a needle
while performing a biopsy. See id.The decedent was hospitalized for two days for
treatment of the injury. See id. In the weeks following the biopsy, the decedent notified her primary care physician of chest pain and fatigue, inter alia. See id. On the
day of her death, the decedent's husband advised her primary care physicians of her
worsening condition. See id. After examining her at the hospital, the physicians released her and advised her to rest at home. See id. Later that evening, she died in her
home. See id.
The court looked to the HMO's advertisements to find that the plaintiff raised a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the physicians involved were the ostensible agents of the HMO, thus exposing the HMO to vicarious liability. See id. at 1231.
72 For a discussion of performance data, see infra notes 102-12 and accompanying
text.
73 See Gosfield, supra note 31, at 66. In anticipation of this possibility, attorneys
practicing in this area have an obvious preventive role. See id.
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upon claims that the organization failed to provide the quality of
care promised. 4
An increased reliance by the courts on contract theories honors consumer expectations.7 5 Courts have held that allegations
concerning the quality of the primary care physicians and the availability of specialist referrals are sufficient to state a claim for breach
of contract where the services rendered differed from consumer
expectations based on advertisements. 76 Thus, the publication of
performance and outcome data, while meeting the demands of
consumers, may expose health care organizations to increased lia74 See id.; see also McClellan v. Health Maintenance Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053, 1055
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). The plaintiff brought a suit against the managed care organization and the primary care physician on behalf of his wife, a deceased subscriber. See
id. The decedent chose a primary care physician from the list of providers supplied by
the HMO. See id. The primary care physician removed a mole from the decedent's
back without performing a biopsy or histology exam even though the decedent told
him of the marked changes in size and color that the mole had recently undergone.
See id. The plaintiff's claim against the physician was based on the allegation that the
physician's failure to perform the proper tests resulted in his or her failure to make a
timely diagnosis of the decedent's malignant melanoma. See id. The plaintiff also
alleged that the HMO was negligent in selecting the physician as a provider. See id.
In addition to these negligence claims, the plaintiff also sought recovery on a
breach of contract and warranty theory. See id. The plaintiff alleged that the HMO
expressly made representations regarding the qualifications of primary care physicians and the availability of consultations and treatment by specialists through referrals of the primary care physician. See id. The plaintiffs alleged that the HMO
expressly made representations through contracts and other documents that the primary care physicians underwent vigorous screening and were required to meet strict
criteria to be qualified as a primary care physician. See id. at 1062. Additionally, the
documentation allegedly represented that the decedent's primary care physician underwent such screening and met the proper criteria and that the decedent would be
referred to specialists as required for medical treatment. See id. Thus, the plaintiff
alleged that the HMO breached the provisions for a competent primary care physician and appropriate referrals. See id.
The court held that these allegations sufficiently stated a breach of contract claim
against the HMO and it remanded with instructions to reinstate the complaint. See id.
at 1062-63.
75 SeeJOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLo, THE LAw OF CoNTRACrs § 1-4, at 9

(3d ed. 1987). One of "the foundation [s] of contract law... [is] .. .in the expectations engendered by, and the promisee's consequent reliance upon, the promise." Id.
76 See McClellan, 604 A.2d at 1062; see also Boyd v. Einstein, 547 A.2d 1229, 1231
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). The Boyd court looked to the plan's advertisements, which
guaranteed quality medical services. See Boyd, 547 A.2d at 1231. The HMO at issue in
Boyd particularly advertised that its participating physicians were competent and subject to a strict evaluation process. See id. The concurring opinion noted that it was
unclear, based on the pleadings, upon which theory of recovery the plaintiff had relied. See id. at 1235 (McEwen, J., concurring). The concurring judge stated that the
plaintiffs allegations supported a breach of warranty theory. See id. As well, the trial
court stated that the gravamen of the complaint, despite the plaintiffs contention of
vicarious liability, was a breach of warranty of quality. See id. at 1235 n.1.
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bility by essentially heightening the standard of care.7 7
B.

Allowing Consumers to Bargain: Relying on Private Contracts

Contract law, which is based upon mutual assent, allows parties to define their respective obligations and rights.7 8 While the
doctor-patient relationship is essentially contractual, however, the
terms of the relationship have been defined almost exclusively by
tort law.79 Thus, all plans must essentially conform to the same
legal standards, thereby reducing the impact and effectiveness of
consumer choice.8 0
The use of private health care contracts would allow patients
to customize their health care entitlements, providing individuals
with a greater role in determining the quality, quantity, and cost of
health care services purchased." Proponents of the private contract approach argue that patient entitlements should not be determined by statutes, common law courts, or unilateral contract terms
of health plans or providers.8 2 Because individuals have differing
needs and concerns, the enforcement of private contracts would
empower individual consumers to pursue their interests. 83 Therefore, the enforcement of private contracts would ultimately defer
decisions regarding cost/benefit trade-offs inherent in health care
84
to the patient/consumer.
77 See Gosfield, supra note 31, at 62, 66.
78 See CAIAmAMi
& PERILLO, supra note 75, § 1-4, at 8. The authors state that
"[r]ecognizing the desirability of allowing individuals to regulate, to a large extent,
their own affairs, the State has conferred upon them the power to bind themselves by
expression of their intention to be bound, provided, always, that they operate within
the limit of their delegated powers." Id. "Contract[ual] obligations are created to
enforce promises which are manifestations not only of a present intention to do or
not to do something, but also of a commitment to the future. They are, therefore,
obligations based on the manifested intention of the parties to a bargaining transaction." KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 92, at 656.
79 See WEILER, supra note 10, at 94.
80 See Clark C. Havighurst, Public Choices, Private Choices, and American Health Policy,
in HEALTH CARE REFORM AND ANTITRUST 61, 65 (1994).
81 See id. at 65, 66.
82 See id. at 66.
83 See id.
84 See id. at 65. Promoting the use of private contract would empower consumers
to customize their health care entitlements. See id. at 67. Because all plans must conform to the same legal requirements, the choices currently available in the health
care system are limited. See id. at 65. The use of private contracts would allow plans to
create and consumers to choose alternative standards and requirements. See id. Havighurst argues that the current market does not provide consumers with sufficient
options, particularly denying low-cost options. See id.at 63.
Weiler states that there are two possible approaches to substituting a voluntary
contract approach to medical liability and suggests that it may be time to reevaluate
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Serving up medical liability to private contract, however,
would likely result in a trend towards less liability.8 5 Moreover, the
safeguards that contract law provides against unfair bargains-for
example, unconscionability, fraud, and coercion-would inadequately protect health care consumers because, given the nature of
the interest, prospectively ensuring quality care is warranted.
III.

ARMING CONSUMERS WITH INFORMATION

In many contexts, consumer protection legislation mandates
the disclosure of material information by sellers, thereby ensuring
that consumers can effectively protect their interests through bargaining.8 6 Similarly, in the health care context, the informed consent doctrine developed to ensure that patients be given the
opportunity to make informed choices regarding their treatment."7
the judicial distaste for private efforts to alter the traditional tort model. See WEILER,
supra note 10, at 95-96. The "wholesale approach" would allow patients free reign to
negotiate tort liability with their doctors, while the "retail approach" would only
loosen the restraints with respect to certain aspects of the liability problem. See id. at
96. Although arguments based on autonomy may justify the "wholesale approach," if
no-liability was an option, it could quickly become the norm. See id.
85 See id. WEILER, supra note 10, at 94, 113.
86 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1988). The Truth in Lending Law requires that
creditors disclose important credit terms to potential debtors. See id.
87 See Szczygiel, supra note 47, at 171. Although jurisdictions vary in their formulations, the doctrine generally requires that a patient be given enough information regarding a certain procedure and its risks to make a knowledgeable decision regarding
the treatment. See id. at 190. "True consent to what happens to one's self is the
informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon each." Canterbury v. Spence,
464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted).
The scope of the duty to inform a patient is shaped by the right of self-decision;
thus, all risks must be divulged that would be material to a reasonable patient's decision. See id. at 786-87; see also Largey v. Rothman, 110 N.J. 204, 213, 540 A.2d 504, 509
(1988) (adopting the reasonable patient standard for disclosure).
Many states have also codified this requirement in their legislation. See, e.g.,
ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.556(a) (Michie 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-206(b) (Michie
1987) (adopting a standard based on the type of information that a similarly trained
and experienced physician would provide); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1645 (West
Supp. 1996) (outlining the duty of disclosure regarding blood transfusions); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1690 (West 1990) (outlining the duty of disclosure and
specifying the type of information that must be given regarding hysterectomies); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24173 (West 1992) (outlining the general requirements of
providing patients with sufficient information to give informed consent); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-2816 (1993) (defining informed consent as consent based upon the information customarily given to similar patients). For example, the Alaska health care
malpractice statute provides that:
A health care provider is liable for failure to obtain the informed consent of a patient if the claimant establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that the provider has failed to inform the patient of the common risks and reasonable alternatives to the proposed treatment or pro-
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Thus, for approximately three decades, courts have recognized
that patients should have an active role in determining the course
of medical treatment and that patients require certain information
regarding treatment to make informed decisions. 8 Given the
changing nature of our health care system, the consumer's need
for information has expanded because decisions on which plan to
join may affect the quality and quantity of care ultimately
received. 89
The ability of managed care to control health care costs is premised on the following assumption: because patients follow the directives of their physicians, an entity could control costs by telling
physicians how to practice medicine.9" This theory, based on consumer ignorance, is outdated in the age of the "information superhighway." 9 1 A more appropriate system would be premised on the
assumption that patients will be well-informed regarding what the
medical field has to offer.9 2
Despite the underlying presumption of consumer ignorance,
the growth and commercialization of managed care is encouraging
cedure, and that but for that failure the claimant would not have
consented to the proposed treatment or procedure.
ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.556(a) (Michie 1995).
See Szczygiel, supra note 47, at 175-215 for a history of the development of the
informed consent doctrine. Szczygiel divides his history into two developmental periods and traces the evolution of legal standards aimed at giving increased weight to
patient autonomy in deciding whether to undertake the risks of any treatment. See id.
88 See Szczygiel, supra note 47, at 171. Notions of patients' rights in determining
the course of care continue to change and the doctor-patient relationship is increasingly being viewed as a cooperative one. See id. Today's model of health care decision-making, however, may hinder the progression toward full patient participation.
See id.
The informed consent requirement has been a fairly recent development, as the
concept has evolved within the last thirty years. See Bales & DeMarco, supranote 32, at
421. Liability of physicians is, therefore, not only predicated on their ability to practice medicine, but increasingly on their ability to communicate effectively with their
patients. See id. at 420.
89 See Rosenblatt, supra note 24. at 133. Clinical practice guidelines and incentives
used by managed care plans, for example, may affect the consumer's choice of a particular plan. See id.
90 See John C. Goodman, A Plan to Empower Patients, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1995, at
A18. Goodman projects that the future successful managed care clinic will publicly
disclose its cost-benefit standards so that individual consumers will be able to choose a
plan depending on its general approach to care. See id.
91 See id. The Internet and other computer services feature various medical libraries and databases, diagnosis trees, and discussion groups centering on particular ailments that will increasingly provide consumers with information regarding what
medicine has to offer. See id.
92 See id.
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the development of a well-informed patient/consumer.93 As the
health care industry rapidly changes to offer new delivery and financing systems, the industry is increasingly becoming commercialized.9 4 As patients become consumers, physicians become
providers, and the new health care delivery systems are seemingly
eroding the traditional doctor-patient relationship upon which
physicians' identities and patients' trust have been based.9 5 This
changing doctor-patient relationship necessitates a corresponding
shift in the focus of a consumer's quality concerns. 9 6 In addition,
See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
For the past two decades, the commercialization of medicine has been a dominant trend. See Patricia H. Werhane, The Ethics of Health Care as a Business, in HEALTH
CARE ETHICS 334, 337 (John F. Monagh & David C. Thomasma eds., 1994) (arguing
that exploitation, not commercialization, is the enemy of the health care system and
that a market model would promote a more equal distribution of health care benefits). The health care system has evolved into an industry "with a trillion-dollar share
of the economy" and has been transformed from a purely professional endeavor into
a business. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 11, at 394-96.
The health care industry is becoming a big business-a recent acquisition of MetraHealth by United HealthCare resulted in the creation of one of the country's largest health care companies. See Leslie Scism, United HealthCare Agrees to Acquire
MetraHealthfor Up to $2.35 Billion, WALL ST. J.,June 27, 1995, at A2. The company is
expected to provide services to over 14 million members, resulting in an annual revenue over $8 billion. See id. United HealthCare, which is one of the nation's largest
owners and operators of HMOs, is expected to try to persuade a greater percentage of
MetraHealth's 10.7 million members to enroll in HMOs. See id.
Additionally, the model of the modern health care system as a commercial enterprise is expanded wherein a physician is also a consumer of hospital services while
remaining a supplier to the patient/customer. See Christopher H. Coulter, If Patients
93

94

Are Now "Customers," What Does that Make Physicians?, PHvslctAN ExEcuTIvE, Feb. 1995,

at 20.
HMOs represent competition in the health care field. See McCLELLAN, supranote

13, at 68. Competition in the industry was principally precipitated by the introduction of the HMO and the application of anti-trust laws. See id; Ginzberg, supra note 4,
at 760 (arguing that a competitive market is an opponent of cost control because
advertising and marketing increase with the capacity of the market, and as the system
is expanded, the duplication of services is encouraged).
95 See Coulter, supra note 94, at 19-20. Quality standards dictated by consumer
demands and satisfaction threaten physicians. See id. The physician's role essentially
changes because he or she is no longer only obligated to provide care to a patient, but
is also obligated to deliver "quality" and to provide services that will be continuously
measured and evaluated with an eye towards improving the clinical outcomes. See id.
The doctor-patient relationship is stretching to allow for the increased communication and coordination among providers and more informed and educated decisionmaking by patients. See Sage &Jorling, supra note 2, at 1012. "Today, most would not
recognize Norman Rockwell's portrait of the family doctor." Dunn v. Praiss, 139 N.J.
564, 568, 656 A.2d 413, 415 (1995).
96 Competition among plans is also encouraging managed care systems to emphasize administrative accessibility and efficiency to its consumers. See Sage & Jorling,
supra note 2, at 1019. This further evidences the changing nature of the doctor-patient relationship, as the first contact of most patients/consumers is often the health
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as medicine is commercialized through initiatives such as cost containment and UR, courts are increasingly viewing patients as consumers in a competitive marketplace who are entitled to make
informed judgments concerning their care.9 7
In the past, many changes within the health care system were
driven by the desire and need to control costs. 9" Today, the most
recent debates regarding the health care system focus on the impact of the previous changes on the quality of health care provided.9 9 Thus, within the new commercial setting of health care,
purchasers are demanding "'value' for their health care dollar"
and information upon which to choose a plan.'0 0 As managed care
matures as an option for the delivery of health care, organizations
find themselves in a competitive industry in which they must compete for patients based on both the cost and quality of the health
care provided. 0 1
This commercial interest in the quality of health care has
sparked a demand for data reflecting various quality measures.10 2
plan, not the physician. See id. Administrative accessibility and efficiency also serves
the plan's interest in reducing the unnecessary utilization of services. See id.
97 See Bales & DeMarco, supra note 32, at 509. The impact of the current changes
within the health care system will have unforeseen impacts on the relationship between the patient and physician and may have an impact on the patient's role. See
Szczygiel, supra note 47, at 173. Current informed consent principles will have a minor role in the cost conscious system, which is marked by standardized treatments. See
id. at 174. Cost containment will limit the choices with which both patients and physicians are faced and will change the type of information available to patients. See id.
See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Comparing Medical Providers: A First Look
at the New Era of Medical Statistics, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 5 (1992) for a discussion of provider-specific information and data, which attempt to measure the success of specific
providers as to a given procedure, and the role of such information in malpractice
and informed consent actions. See also Douglas Sharrot, Note, Provider-Specific Qualityof-Care Data: A Proposalfor Limited Mandatory Disclosure, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 85 (1992)
(arguing that disclosure of provider-specific data would enhance patients' ability to
make informed decisions regarding which physician or health plan to chose).
98 See Gosfield, supra note 31, at 31.
99 See id. Another motivation for the increased effort to develop information is the
internal use of the information and the data to guide judgments regarding the management of care. See id. at 32.
100 See id. at 31 (footnote omitted), 32.
101 See Sage &Jorling, supra note 2, at 1017.
102 See Gosfield, supra note 31, at 67; see also Norma Harris, How Hospitals Measure
Up, Bus. & HEALTH, Aug. 1994, at 20 (discussing how HMOs are increasingly being
pressured by employers and individual consumers to report their efforts to provide
quality care and that hospitals are likewise being demanded to demonstrate their
quality of care).

The concern for value has introduced a new vocabulary to the industry; among
the common indicators of quality are "effectiveness," "clinical indicators," "performance measures," "outcomes," and "satisfaction." See Gosfield, supra note 31, at 31.
The three traditional areas of quality assessment are the structure ("the physical envi-
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Although the reliability and usefulness of the currently available
information have been questioned, a uniform reporting system
would transform the market.' 0 3 However, the quality concerns of
the major types of consumers in the health care system-employers, governments, and individuals-are divergent, and until now,
the efforts to produce and collect data have focused on the concerns of employers and other purchasing alliances.1 0 4 Reflecting
the demands of a competitive market, the most recent efforts con10 5
cerning performance data focus on comparative reporting.
As a result of this demand for information, there is a growing
effort at various levels of government and within various parts of
the health care system to collect, share, and evaluate data that purronment, qualifications of personnel, and organizational structure of the delivery
site"), process (the manner in which care is delivered-"including technical competence and the appropriateness of services to a patient's condition"), and outcomes
(the results of the care provided). Id. at 35.
103 See Harris, supra note 102, at 20. "'Report cards' will transform the health care
market." Id. (quoting Patrick Casey, the executive director of a coalition of employers). Report cards with a standardized reporting system, however, are likely years
away. See Susan Brink & Rita Rubin, Managing Managed Care, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., July 24, 1995, at 60.
104 There are two "consumers" of health care in our system-the purchaser of a
plan and the ultimate patient-each with their own concerns regarding value. See
Gosfield, supra note 31, at 37. Until now, the interest in value has been geared towards the interests of employers as purchasers of health care for its employees, as
alliances and employers constitute the majority of purchasers in today's system. See id.
at 33; Brink & Rubin, supra note 103, at 60.
All purchasers of health care-individuals, employers, and insurance companies-have an economic interest in choosing providers that offer quality services at a
low price. See McCLELLAN, supra note 13, at 68-69. All purchasers also have an interest in considering the value of an increase in quality with its attendant increased cost.
See id. at 69.
Employers and other alliances are concerned with access, efficiency, appropriateness of care, acceptable technical outcomes, and patient satisfaction. See Gosfield,
supra note 31, at 37-38. Patients, as the ultimate consumers, are initially most concerned with the cost of the plan, the coverage of the plan, whether their physician is
enrolled in a particular plan, and an overall sense of satisfaction. See id. at 38. Other
concerns of individuals, which are factors when choosing a health plan, are convenience and other personal considerations. See Brink & Rubin, supra note 103, at 60.
Because individuals have differing needs and concerns, it would make more
sense for the clinics to directly sell their services to individual consumers, not employers, so that individuals will be able to pursue their own self-interests in a competitive
market. See Goodman, supra note 90, at A18.
While some of the recent efforts are coming closer to meeting the informational
needs of the average individual consumer, the ratings and information currently available provide information more useful to employers, like cost statistics, rather than
information that reveals which plan provides the best coverage for an individual with
any specific health concern or problem. See Brink & Rubin, supra note 103, at 60.
105 See Gosfield, supra note 31, at 38.
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ports to address the measures of quality that concern consumers.10 6
In addition, legislatures are increasingly mandating that managed
care systems publicly disclose certain data as a requirement for
accreditation. 107
Pennsylvania was the first state to use its regulatory power to
increase the information available to consumers concerning quality. 108 In this regard, the Pennsylvania Legislature established a
Health Care Cost Containment Council to aid in the collection and
dissemination of data regarding the quality and cost of health care
in the state. 109 The legislation authorizes the Council to collect
information from providers.'
The Council then issues reports to
the public, as well as the legislature, that furnishes information
comparing providers."1
106 See id. The Wall Street Journalrecently reported that an alliance of major buyers
of health services, including public-sector as well as corporate purchasers and the
overseeing body of Medicare, were planning to join together to develop measures for
evaluating HMOs. See What's News, Business and Finance,WALL ST. J., July 3, 1995, at
A2; see also Ron Winslow, Big Buyers of Health Care Unite to Rate HMOs, WALL ST. J., July
3, 1995, at A3 (endeavoring to provide health care consumers with information to
help them choose a managed care plan).
107 See Gosfield, supra note 31, at 53-54.
108 See id. at 54; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 449.1-449.19 (West Supp. 1996).
109 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 449.2 (West Supp. 1996). The Act makes and adopts
the following findings and policy:
The General Assembly finds that there exists in this Commonwealth a
major crisis because of the continuing escalation of costs for health care
services.... Increasing costs are also undermining the quality of health
care services currently being provided ....
Therefore, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to promote health care cost containment and to identify appropriate
utilization practices by creating an independent council to be known as
the Health Care Cost Containment Council. It is the purpose of this
legislation to ... encourag[e] the development of competitive health
care services in which health care costs are contained and to assure that
all citizens have reasonable access to quality health care. It is further the
intent of this act to facilitate the continuing provision of quality, costeffective health services throughout the Commonwealth by providing
current, accurate data and information to the purchasers and consumers of health care on both cost and quality of health care services and to
public officials for the purpose of determining health-related programs
and policies and to assure access to health care services....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 449.2 (West Supp. 1996).
110 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 449.5(d) (West Supp. 1996). The Council is authorized to adopt a methodology for the collection and dissemination of data. See id.
§ 449.5(d) (4).
111 See id. § 449.7. The Act requires the council to collect and disseminate data
regarding all covered services, which are defined as
[a]ny health care services or procedures connected with episodes of illness that require either inpatient hospital care or major ambulatory service such as surgical, medical or major radiological procedures,
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Because a consumer's decision about which managed care
plan to subscribe to is likely to have an effect on the quantity and
quality of care he or she ultimately receives, a patient's right to
make an informed decision extends to the choice of a plan. 112 To
the extent that information similar to that mandated by Pennsylvania law allows consumers to make an informed choice regarding their health care, consumers are protected by the availability of
such information.
CONCLUSION

The means chosen to protect health care consumers reflect a
judgment regarding the appropriate actors to make health care decisions. For example, a decision to protect patients through legislation mandating particular services, such as minimum hospital stay

provisions, rests upon the judgment that government has a proper
role in deciding appropriate medical care. Similarly, systems fashioned around private contracting or the increased availability of
information assume that the patient/consumer should be the primary decision-maker. Thus, the appropriateness of a health care

consumer protection system is partially determined by whether it
maintains proper roles for the various health care actors.
The traditional, and still primary, health care consumer protection mechanism is malpractice law. The traditional tort system,
however, does not effectively protect patients/consumers in today's
system. In response, other approaches are being debated and exincluding any initial and follow-up outpatient services associated with
the episode of illness before, during or after inpatient hospital care or
major ambulatory service.
Id. § 449.3.
For every covered service performed in the state, the council must collect information about the patient, diagnoses, procedures performed, admitting and consulting physicians, health care facility, charges, and payments. See id. § 449.6.
The reports compare providers with information such as provider service effectiveness, cost, incident rates, mortality rates, infection rates, and readmission rates
grouped according to the diagnosis, procedure, and severity. See id.
112 See Rosenblatt, supranote 24, at 133. For example, knowledge of practice guidelines may improve a patient's informed consent, participation in decision-making,
and overall satisfaction with the plan. See id. The 1992 Institute Of Medicine Report
also raises some interesting issues regarding informing patients of the practice guidelines for the purpose of making an informed choice as to which plan to join, as well as
giving informed consent to a particular course of treatment. See id. Questions remain
concerning the publication of such information, such as the extent of the information that should be available to patients regarding treatment options that are not
covered by a particular plan. See id.; seeAssEssING HELTH CARE REFORM 40 (MarilynJ.
Field et al. eds., 1993) (noting that clinical practice guidelines may improve, inter
alia, patients' informed consent and their role in health care decision-making).
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perimented with, resulting in the current patchwork protection of
patients/consumers that has developed in the courts and legislatures. None of the current approaches to the exclusion of the
others presents a comprehensive solution; each approach, however, has merits that should be recognized.
Thus, there is no need to choose a consumer protection system. Given the complexity of the evolving system, such a choice
would likely leave some problems unaddressed and, therefore,
some injuries uncompensated. Moreover, the law generally recognizes the varied nature of consumer injuries, as consumers in other
areas of the economy have a variety of remedies at their disposal.
Thus, the patchwork nature of the current state of affairs is not in
itself problematic.
Some of the initiatives, however, further threaten the doctorpatient partnership as the core of treatment decision-making,
which is endangered by managed care itself. Health care consumer protection, therefore, should endeavor to reflect the changing nature of the decision-making process while seeking to
preserve the primary decision-making role of the doctor-patient
partnership.
Jennifer A. Hradil

